How Email Spoofing Leads to Invoice Fraud and CEO Impersonation
Most business email fraud is not technically sophisticated. It relies on one thing: a message that appears to come from someone you trust. Here is how the main variants work and which defences stop each one.
The most expensive email attacks against businesses rarely involve malware or clever hacking. They involve a short, plausible message that appears to come from someone the recipient trusts, asking them to do something they do every week: pay an invoice, update a supplier’s banking details, or process an urgent transfer for the CEO. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded $2.77 billion in business email compromise losses across 21,442 reported incidents in 2024. Understanding how these attacks work is the first step in knowing which defences actually stop them.
The four ways criminals impersonate you
People often use “spoofing” to describe every kind of email impersonation, but there are four distinct techniques. They look similar to the victim and require completely different defences.
| Technique | What the recipient sees | Stopped by enforced DMARC? |
|---|---|---|
| Exact domain spoofing | accounts@yourcompany.co.za, your real address | Yes |
| Lookalike domain | accounts@yourcompany-co.za or yourcornpany.co.za | No |
| Display name spoofing | “Your CEO” <ceo.office@gmail.com> | No |
| Compromised mailbox | Your real address, sent from your real account | No |
An honest security provider will show you that table. DMARC decisively stops the first row, and that row matters: it is the version that is most convincing, costs the criminal nothing, and works against every client, supplier and employee who knows your address. It is also the one you can close completely with a DNS policy.
How invoice redirection works
A typical payment redirection attack follows a predictable script.
- Reconnaissance. The criminal learns who your clients or suppliers are, often from your website, LinkedIn, or a previously compromised mailbox elsewhere in the chain.
- The message. An email arrives from what appears to be your accounts department, often timed near month end. It says your bank account has changed and attaches a letter on convincing letterhead.
- Urgency. A follow-up asks whether the payment has been processed, adding pressure and discouraging a phone call.
- The payment. Your client updates the banking details and pays the next invoice into the criminal’s account. Neither side knows until you chase the unpaid invoice.
When the first message comes from your exact domain, the client has no visible reason to doubt it. Without an enforced DMARC policy, many receiving servers will deliver it, because you have not told them otherwise.
How CEO impersonation works
CEO fraud turns the same technique inward. A message that appears to come from a director asks someone in finance to make an urgent, confidential payment, often while the director is supposedly travelling or in a meeting and cannot be reached. The request exploits hierarchy and urgency together.
Criminals use whichever variant works. If your domain is not enforced, exact spoofing is easiest. If it is enforced, they fall back to display name tricks from free email accounts, or to lookalike domains, which are more likely to be noticed by a careful reader. Enforcement does not end the threat, but it forces attackers onto routes that are easier to spot.
What an enforced DMARC policy changes
At p=reject, a message claiming to come from your domain that fails authentication is refused by the receiving server during delivery. It never reaches the inbox, the spam folder or anyone’s attention. This protects:
- Your clients, from payment requests forged with your address.
- Your suppliers, from fake purchase orders and remittance advice.
- Your own staff, from internal impersonation that arrives from outside.
- Your brand, because your domain stops being a free tool for criminals.
At p=none, none of this happens. We explain why in why monitoring-only DMARC is a false sense of security.
Closing the gaps DMARC does not cover
Lookalike domains
Register the most obvious variants of your domain yourself, particularly other extensions and common misspellings, and give them a reject policy and an SPF record that authorises nothing. Mail filtering that flags newly registered or similar-looking domains adds another layer.
Display name spoofing
Configure your mail platform to label messages from external senders, and to warn when an external message uses the name of someone in your organisation. Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace both support this.
Compromised mailboxes
Enforce multi-factor authentication on every mailbox, watch for suspicious inbox rules that forward or hide mail, and remove access promptly when staff leave.
Process controls
The strongest defence against payment fraud is not technical at all. Any change to banking details should be confirmed by phone on a number already on record, never on one supplied in the email. Tell your clients that you will never change banking details by email alone, and put that statement on your invoices. Many South African banks also offer account verification services that confirm an account holder before a new beneficiary is paid.
The short version
- Business email fraud relies on trust, not technology, and it is enormously costly.
- Enforced DMARC completely stops criminals using your exact domain, the most convincing variant.
- Lookalike domains, display name tricks and compromised mailboxes need other controls.
- Verifying banking changes by phone on a known number stops the attacks that get through.
Frequently asked questions
Can DMARC stop a criminal using our CEO's name from a Gmail address?
No. That attack uses the display name only, with an address on a domain you do not control. It is stopped by mail filtering that flags external senders using internal names, and by staff who know to check the actual address.
Our client paid a fraudulent invoice that looked like ours. Are we liable?
That depends on the facts and the agreements between you, and it is a question for a legal adviser. What an enforced DMARC policy does is remove one of the ways such an email can carry your exact address, which strengthens your position and protects the relationship.
What is the single most effective control against payment redirection?
Verifying any change of banking details by phone, on a number already on record rather than one supplied in the email. Technical controls reduce the number of fraudulent requests that arrive; verification stops the ones that get through.
Sources and standards
- FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center: 2024 Internet Crime Report. Reported losses to business email compromise and other email-led fraud.
- RFC 7489: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). The IETF specification that defines DMARC policies, alignment and reporting.
Keep reading
What Is DMARC, and Why It Is No Longer Optional
DMARC is the record that decides whether criminals can send email as your business. Here is how it works, what the three policies really do, and why monitoring alone protects nothing.
Why Monitoring-Only DMARC Is a False Sense of Security
A DMARC record at p=none ticks the box on a checklist and blocks nothing. If your domain has been at monitoring for more than a few months, it is not protected.
Rolling Out DMARC Safely: From p=none to p=reject
Enforcement is where DMARC protects you and where it can hurt you. This is the sequence that gets a domain to p=reject without blocking the invoices, statements and bookings your business depends on.
Find out where your domain stands
Send us your domain. We will review your DMARC, SPF and DKIM set-up, map the services sending as you, and tell you plainly what it would take to reach enforcement. No charge and no obligation.